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Abstract: A proliferation of recent media coverage has addressed the latest 
advances in artificial intelligence. While expressing admiration for its potential, 
these publications have worried about the negative impact AI could have on the 
social order. These sentiments are not new. Similar headlines have accompanied 
aƌtiĐles aďout Đoŵputeƌs eǀeƌ siŶĐe the fiƌst ͚MeĐhaŶiĐal BƌaiŶs͛ appeaƌed. 
However, archives reveal that experiments in AI have been undertaken for many 
years, and yet progress has been fairly limited. Yet, no matter how far away true AI 
might be, concerns about the consequences of technology remain valid. What is it 
about our relationship with technology that scares us? We appear to be convinced 
that the technologies we develop will turn out to destroy us. The paper proposes 
that fundamental changes need to be made in the discourse of technological 
progress in order for it to be accepted as more of an opportunity than a threat. 
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Technology, Society, Predictions, 
Fear 
1. Introduction 
There has been a proliferation of media coverage recently addressing the latest advances in artificial 
intelligence (AI). Quality newspapers have regularly been running articles about the subject (A quick 
look at just one newspaper, The Guardian (and its sister paper The Observer) over the last 18 months 
produced 34 significant articles: Adams, 2015; Aitkenhead, 2016; Allen, 2015; Avent, 2016; Bunting, 
2016; Burton-Hill, 2016; Chatfield, 2016; Elliot, 2016, 2017; Fox, 2015; Harford, 2016; Harris, 2016; 
Heritage, 2016; Hern, 2016 (4); Marsden, 2016; McCurry, 2017; McMullen, 2016; Mumford, 2016; 
Naughton, 2015, 2016 (2), 2017; Parkin, 2015; Sample, 2016; Seager, 2016; Solon 2017; Stewart, 
2015; Treanor, 2016; Tucker, 2016; Wales, 2017; Williams, 2016). Several significant academic books 
on the subject have also recently been published (Barrat, 2013; Frase, 2016; Hanson, 2016; Harari, 
2016). While expressing admiration for the potential of AI, most of this coverage has expressed 
serious concern about the negative impact AI could have on the social order. The titles are telling: A 
prominent example being the cover of the 25 June 2016 issue of New Scientist, ǁhiĐh asks ͚WheŶ 
Machines Take Over: What will humans do when computers run the world?͛ 
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Alongside this accumulation of articles and books, there has been a recent abundance of popular 
entertainment titles that address similar issues. It has been a enduring trope of science fiction to 
portray the perilous possibilities of artificial intelligences gaining human consciousness, but lately this 
aspect appears to have become even more prominent. Movies such as Ex_Machina (Macdonald, 
Reich & Garland, 2015) and television series such as Humans (Fry, 2015) and Westworld (Wickham, 
2016) serve to proselytize about the potential hazards of AI to a much wider audience.  
Clearly, this unease in the media about machines taking over reflects the serious concerns society 
has about the impact of AI at this moment. Yet, as we know, these sentiments are not new. 
HaƌƌoǁiŶg headliŶes aĐĐoŵpaŶied aƌtiĐles aďout the fiƌst ŵaiŶfƌaŵe Đoŵputeƌs, oƌ ͚MeĐhaŶiĐal 
BƌaiŶs͛, deĐlaƌiŶg ͚The ‘oďots aƌe CoŵiŶg!͛, ƌepoƌtiŶg that ͚Ouƌ ĐiǀilizatioŶ is ďeiŶg iŶǀaded ďǇ a 
horde of mechanical men who are determined to change our way of life.͛ ;Daǀid, ϭϵϱϯ, p. 53) And 
ǁheŶ ͚EleĐtƌoŶiĐ BƌaiŶs͛ staƌted to appeaƌ ĐoŵŵeƌĐiallǇ, aŶ aƌtiĐle iŶ Time magazine warned that 
using these machines gave one man the computing ability of 25,000 trained mathematicians (Anon, 
1955, p. 81). No wonder people were worried. The hopes of salvation embodied in futuristic 
technologies appear to have always carried a caveat with them—a fear that we may become the 
victims of the very technologies we create. 
2. Automatic Writing 
It was while researching the topic of how computers had been presented to the public historically 
that I came across the following information about early attempts at artificial intelligence. The 
archives, at the Computer History Museum in Mountain View, California, and the Charles Babbage 
Institute at the University of Minnesota, reveal that experiments in AI have been undertaken for far 
longer than might be realised, and yet in many respects the advances made seem to have been, for 
many years, fairly limited. The lack of progress reflected in the lack of change in our own fears 
referred to above. AI seems to be a harder goal to achieve than many thought. 
Scientists have speculated about the jobs that electronic computers would take over from man ever 
since they were first iŶǀeŶted. A Đhapteƌ iŶ oŶe ϭϵϰϵ teǆt ǁas titled ͚The Futuƌe: ŵaĐhiŶes that thiŶk 
aŶd ǁhat theǇ ŵight do foƌ ŵeŶ.͛ This Đhapteƌ ĐoŶtaiŶed foƌeĐasts of possiďle ƌoles aŶd pƌoďleŵs 
the computer would solve, and many of them have proved accurate: controlling the temperature in 
houses, automatic pilots on planes, automatic factories, weather forecasting, business production 
sĐheduliŶg, eĐoŶoŵiĐ foƌeĐastiŶg aŶd so oŶ. The authoƌ ǁƌote, ͞This pƌospeĐt fills us ǁith ĐoŶĐeƌŶ as 
well as with amazement. How shall we control these automatic machines, these robots, these 
FƌaŶkeŶsteiŶs? What ǁill theƌe ďe left foƌ us to do to eaƌŶ ouƌ liǀiŶg?͟ ;BeƌkeleǇ, ϭϵϰϵ, p. ϭϴϵ) 
The saŵe Đhapteƌ ĐoŶtaiŶed a list of ͚Futuƌe tǇpes of ŵaĐhiŶes that thiŶk͛, ǁhiĐh ďegaŶ: • Automatic Address Book • Automatic Library • Automatic Translator • Automatic Typist [handwriting recognition] • Automatic Stenographer [voice recognition] 
And so shows that a computer storing and producing a written text from a variety of input sources 
was always expected to be a function of the computer. It is understandable, then, that this turned 
out to be one of the first areas for experiments in applied artificial intelligence—attempts to have a 
computer produce original texts of their own creation.  
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2.1 SAGA II: The Western Computer Playwright 
In 1960, a research group at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)—the Computer 
Applications Group in the Electronic Systems Laboratory—used the first transistor-based computer 
called TX-0 to produce the screenplay for a Western. The TX-0, first built in 1956, had originally been 
fitted with what was then considered to be an enormous memory of 64Kb, but in 1958 this was 
tƌaŶsfeƌƌed iŶto the Đoŵputeƌ͛s suĐĐessoƌ, the TX-2, and replaced first with a standard 4Kb of 
memory, which was later doubled to 8Kb (McKenzie, 1974). The team described the development of 
͚“AGA II—the TV script-ǁƌitiŶg Pƌogƌaŵ͛ iŶ aŶ iŶteƌŶal ŵeŵo as a branching system of possibilities 
with variables having different probabilities of occurring—for example—deciding if a robber sees the 
sheriff or not, if he shoots or not, and if he manages to hit, nick or miss him (Morse, 1960). These 
branching systems resembled complex flowcharts, and which could be randomly selected and used 
in a variety of ways by the computer in order to produce a storyline. (Figure 1) A press release from 
American Machine & Foundry Company described the process: 
TX-0 Digital Computer Developed at MIT Writes Western Drama to be seen on 
CBS-TV from 10-11 pm (EDT) Wednesday Oct 26 
How does a computer write a Western drama for television?  
 
The answer will be seen in an intriguing and informative hour of television from 10 
to 11 pm (EDT) Wednesday, Oct 26, on the CBS TV Network. It will be presented by 
American Machine & Foundry Company. 
But in the meantime, Douglas T Ross, computer scientist at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, gives an insight into the creative life of a computer-
playwright. ‘oss aŶd seǀeƌal MIT Đolleagues ͚ĐoaĐhed͛ the Đoŵputeƌ to ǁƌite a TV 
dƌaŵa foƌ ͚the thiŶkiŶg ŵaĐhiŶe.͛ It oďliged ďǇ ǁƌitiŶg Ŷot oŶe, ďut tǁo WesteƌŶs. 
And in the doing, the computer-MIT͛s TX-0 digital computer-injected a note of 
originality. In the first computer-written Western, the robber dies in accepted 
Western tradition. 
But in another version, the computer permits the robber to kill the sheriff-hardly 
the triumph of justice, but it is a new twist to an old tale. 
Ross, 30-year-old head of the Computer Applications Group in the Electronic 
Systems Laboratory at MIT, said the computer, like its human counterpart, builds a 
Western drama according to a certain set of rules-thus providing a demonstration 
of what scientists call artificial intelligence. 
͞But it is Ŷot a deŵoŶstƌatioŶ that authoƌs aƌe ďeiŶg pushed iŶto oďliǀioŶ͟, ‘oss 
said, ͞The Đhances of ever creating an electronic Euripedes or a transistorized 
Tolstoy are infinitely negligible.͟…. 
The scientists gave the computer a group of things, telling it what properties they 
had, and gave the computer suggested rules for ways in which they could be put 
togetheƌ. This esseŶtiallǇ is ǁhat a huŵaŶ authoƌ does, ‘oss said…. 
Ross emphasized that the computer had to be told how to ďe iŶtelligeŶt…. 
[To make things more interesting, the computer was encouraged to break the 
͚ƌules͛ of ͚iŶtelligeŶt ďehaǀiouƌ͛ ďǇ the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of ͚the iŶeďƌiatioŶ faĐtoƌ͛. 
Everytime a character has a drink, the probability of that character acting 
intelligently is a little less probable, and unintelligent actions a little more 
probable.] (American Machine & Foundry Company, 1960) 
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Figure 1.   Flowchart diagrams of the routines programmed into TX-0 by the researchers of the Computer Applications 
Group. The suďroutiŶe at the top right of the upper iŵage is titled ͚DriŶk͛ aŶd iŶtroduĐes aŶ ͚iŶeďriatioŶ faĐtor͛ of 
uncertainty into the possible storyline. 
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The event was picked up and reported in the New York Times as follows: 
News of TV and Radio: Gadgetry by Val Adams 
A machine-written Western playlet, in which a sheriff and a bandit have a gun duel, 
will be televised this month by the Columbia Broadcasting System. The machine, an 
electronic computer called TX-0, was developed by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. Now that C.B.S. is in the act, TX-0 may become the Zane Grey of 
computers and enjoy many happy residuals. 
The two-ŵiŶute plaǇlet ǁill ďe pƌeseŶted oŶ ͞Toŵoƌƌoǁ͟, a Ŷeǁ sĐieŶĐe seƌies. It 
begins on Oct 26 at 10p.m. with a one-houƌ pƌogƌaŵ titled ͞The ThiŶkiŶg MaĐhiŶe.͟ 
David Wayne, the actor, will be seen visiting M.I.T. and talking to scientists about 
machines that seem capable of reasoning. After Mr. Wayne watches TX-0 type out 
aŶ ͚oƌigiŶal͛ WesteƌŶ, the sĐƌipt, ǁhiĐh is ǁithout dialogue, is peƌfoƌŵed ďǇ tǁo 
aĐtoƌs. …. 
TX-0 was provided with a dramatic situation in which a robber with newly stolen 
money enters a hideout shack and is overtaken there by the sheriff. The machine, 
ǁhiĐh ǁas ͚told͛ that oďjeĐts iŶ the shaĐk iŶĐluded ŵoŶeǇ, a taďle, a glass aŶd a 
bottle of whiskey, then typed out the chain of action and arrived at its own 
denouement. 
C.B.S. will show one version where the sheriff wins and another where the robber is 
victorious. Then just to demonstrate the TX-Ϭ͛s ƌeasoŶiŶg ĐaŶ go off the ďeaŵ, 
another script will show the sheriff puttiŶg his guŶ iŶ the ƌoďďeƌ͛s holsteƌ, pouƌiŶg 
whiskey into a glass but drinking from the bottle. 
The following is the last part of one of the Western dramas as it was typed out by 
TX-0. 
SHERIFF: The sheriff is at the window. Go to door. Wait. Open door. Sees robber. 
Sees sheriff. Go through door. 
ROBBER: Take gun from holster with right hand. Aim. 
SHERIFF: Aim. Fire Robber hit. Blow out barrel. Put gun in holster. 
ROBBER: Fire. Missed. Drop gun. Go to table. Robber dies 
SHERIFF: Go to corner. Pick up money with right hand. Go to door. Go through 
door. Close door. Curtain. 
C.B.S. has not provided equal time for real-life writers to appear on the program in 
rebuttal of TX-Ϭ. But Mƌ. WaǇŶe ǁaƌŶs the M.I.T. sĐieŶtist: ͞If the Đoŵputeƌ eǀeƌ 
learns to act, I͛ll ďƌeak it͛s ďaĐk.͟ (Adams, 1960) 
The eŶd ƌesult of the Đoŵputeƌ͛s effoƌts—the reality of a series of short directions rather than a 
piece of descriptive writing—comes as something of an anti-climax after the fanfare with which it 
was announced, leaving a great deal to be desired. 
2.2 Automatic Novel Writing 
Moving forward 15 years, a conference paper by a group of computer scientist led by Sheldon Klein 
was presented at the International Conference on Computers in the Humanities held in Minneapolis 
in JulǇ ϭϵϳϯ. The papeƌ, titled ͚AutoŵatiĐ Noǀel WƌitiŶg: A status ƌepoƌt͛ desĐƌiďed hoǁ KleiŶ͛s 
research team had programmed a Univac 1108 mainframe computer in FORTRAN V (an early 
programming language) to geŶeƌate ͞ϮϭϬϬ ǁoƌd ŵuƌdeƌ ŵǇsteƌǇ stoƌies, Đoŵplete with semantic 
deep stƌuĐtuƌe, iŶ less thaŶ ϭϵ seĐoŶds.͟  
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The Univac 1108 was a high-end mainframe scientific and business computer first produced in 1965. 
It cost around $1.6m in a typical installation, and had over 1Mb of memory. In other words, it was 
128 times more powerful than the TX-0 used by Ross and his team at MIT to produce a TV script. 
KleiŶ͛s papeƌ ǁeŶt oŶ to state that  
͞The teĐhŶiƋues dƌaǁ upoŶ the state of the aƌt iŶ liŶguistiĐs, Đoŵpileƌ theoƌǇ, aŶd 
micro-siŵulatioŶ …. The Ŷoǀel ǁƌiteƌ desĐƌibed herein is part of an automated 
linguistic tool so powerful and of such methodological significance that we are 
compelled to claim a major breakthrough in linguistic and computational linguistic 
ƌeseaƌĐh.͟ ;KleiŶ, ϭϵϳϯ, p.ϭͿ. 
Sounds promising. However, KleiŶ adŵitted, ͞The eŶd ƌesult is a seƌies of shoƌt stateŵeŶts that 
ǁould iŶ effeĐt pƌoǀide a ͚ďaƌe ďoŶes͛ stƌuĐtuƌe that ǁould ƌeƋuiƌe adaptatioŶ iŶto a sĐƌipt of pƌose.͟ 
He ǁasŶ͛t kiddiŶg. A seƌies of eǆtƌaĐts of the Ŷoǀels appeaƌed iŶ appeŶdiĐes at the end of the report. 
This is a part of one of the Murder Mystery stories produced on the Univac 1108: • The cops questioned Heather. • The Inspector asked the questions. • The cops searched the drawing room. • The policemen found a thread. • The thread was misleading clue [sic]. • Catherine talked with the butler about the murder. • Cathy said that Dr. Bartholomew was kind. • The butler agreed. • Clive was upset about the murder. 
3. Towards Artificial General Intelligence 
The lack of progress between the script produced on the TX-0 computer in 1960 and that produced 
on the staggeringly more powerful Univac 1108 13 years later is quite astonishing, and goes to show 
just how complex these kinds of problems are for computers to solve. Yet we have always expected 
computers to solve them. Early cartoons of mainframe computers appearing in the 1950s were 
anthropomorphised to make them resemble human beings, and were depicted as being able to 
understand hand written instructions fed into them by white-coated operators, and yet in reality, 
handwriting recognition did not come of age until the end of the 1990s, and even today is not 
peƌfeĐt. Otheƌ ĐaƌtooŶs of ͚ŵeĐhaŶiĐal ďƌaiŶs͛ shoǁed theŵ ƌespoŶdiŶg to spokeŶ ĐoŵŵaŶds, aŶd 
yet voice recognition turned out to be an even harder problem to solve, and remains in a highly 
inadequate state, as anyone who has used speech recognition software will attest. 
So, given the recent proliferation of interest in AI outlined at he start of this article, the question now 
ǁould ďe, ͚Has aŶǇ sigŶifiĐaŶt ĐhaŶge oĐĐuƌƌed that has renewed scientists belief in the imminence 
of AI?͛ Well, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to soŵe (but not all), the aŶsǁeƌ is ͚Ǉes͛. The above examples of AI are of the 
type now referred to by computer sĐieŶtists as ͚Ŷaƌƌoǁ͛ oƌ ͚ǁeak͛ AI, ǁheƌe Đoŵputeƌs aƌe pƌe-
programmed and trained to master one particular task where there are a finite number of possible 
actions. A more advanced and better-known example than the automatic writers above, yet one 
which is still ͚Ŷaƌƌoǁ͛ oƌ ͚ǁeak͛ iŶ this ƌespeĐt ǁould ďe IBM͛s ͚Deep Blue͛—a computer that can 
͞ďeat GaƌǇ Kaspaƌoǀ at Đhess, ďut ǁould stƌuggle agaiŶst a thƌee-year-old in a round of noughts and 
Đƌosses.͟ ;Burton-Hill, 2016, p. 16) As shown above, the limitations of such systems are evident. The 
latest deǀelopŵeŶts iŶ AI, though, ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ͚full͛ oƌ ͚stƌoŶg͛ AI, aŶd aƌe kŶoǁŶ as ͚AGI͛—Artificial 
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General Intelligence—defined as Artificial Intelligences that can successfully perform any intellectual 
task that a human could.  
͞We haǀe had ŵaĐhiŶes that ĐaŶ out-calculate us for decades. Now a new wave is 
outperforming us on tasks ranging from image recognition to video-gaming. They 
might soon do our jobs better than we can and may even challenge us in areas as 
sacrosaŶĐt as ĐƌeatiǀitǇ.͟ ;Paul-Choudhury, 2016, p.18) 
The video-gaming success Paul-Choudhury is referring to was achieved in 2015 ďǇ ͚self-taught AI 
softǁaƌe͛ iŶ the foƌŵ of aŶ algoƌithŵ Ŷaŵed ͚Deep-Q Netǁoƌk͛, Đƌeated ďǇ DeepMiŶd, aŶ aƌtifiĐial 
intelligence research company now owned by Google. Deep-Q had learned how to process an input 
shown on screen, interpret and make sense of it, and take decisions that enabled it to become an 
expert player of classic Atari 2600 games including Space Invaders, Breakout, Boxing, and Pong. ͞It 
ǁas a ďƌeakthƌough that ƌoĐked the teĐhŶologǇ ǁoƌld.͟ (Burton-Hill, 2016, p. 18). More was to come. 
“hoƌtlǇ afteƌ this ďƌeakthƌough, DeepMiŶd Đƌeated a seĐoŶd algoƌithŵ Ŷaŵed ͚AlphaGo͛ to plaǇ the 
aŶĐieŶt ChiŶese stƌategǇ gaŵe ͚Go͛. IŶ teƌŵs of a ĐoŵputiŶg ĐhalleŶge, Go presents a much larger 
problem than that of chess: 
͞Its ďƌaŶĐhiŶg faĐtoƌ is huge: it has more possible moves than there are atoms in 
the uŶiǀeƌse; aŶd, uŶlike Đhess, it ĐaŶ͛t ďe figuƌed out ďǇ ďƌute ĐalĐulatioŶ. 
Intractable, it is also impossible to write an evaluation function, i.e. a set of rules 
that tell you who is winning a position and by how much. Instead, it demands 
soŵethiŶg akiŶ to ͚iŶtuitioŶ͛ fƌoŵ its plaǇeƌs: ǁheŶ asked ǁhǇ theǇ ŵade a ĐeƌtaiŶ 
move, professionals often say something along the liŶes of: ͞It felt ƌight.͟ 
Computers, for obvious reasons, have traditionally been terrible at making such 
judgŵeŶts. Go has theƌefoƌe loŶg ďeeŶ ĐoŶsideƌed oŶe of the ͚outstaŶdiŶg gƌaŶd 
ĐhalleŶges͛ of AI, aŶd ŵost ƌesearchers expected at least another decade to pass 
ďefoƌe a ŵaĐhiŶe Đould eǀeŶ hope to ĐƌaĐk it.͟ (Burton-Hill, 2016, p. 18).  
IŶ its Đƌeatoƌ͛s opiŶioŶ, AlphaGo plaǇs iŶ a ǀeƌǇ huŵaŶ ǁaǇ ďeĐause it leaƌŶed iŶ a huŵaŶ ǁaǇ and 
then self-improves through practice as a human would, improving its game and getting stronger as it 
does so. The only difference is that AlphaGo practices continuously: 24 hours a day, every single day, 
without rest. As a result, despite the difficulty of the challenge, AlphaGo beat the European 
champion, Fan Hui, 5 games to nil in Autumn 2015, and in March this year, it beat the world 
champion, Lee Sedol, 4 games to 1. IŶ oŶe of these ŵatĐhes, AlphaGo ǁoŶ ďǇ ͞plaǇiŶg a ŵoǀe that 
departed from centuries of received wisdom. It ĐaŶ͛t eǆpƌess why it did this, but clearly had a 
ƌatioŶale.͟ ;Paul-Choudhury, 2016, p.19). 
The archival research in section 2 of this paper evidences one of the important distinctions between 
progress in AI computer software and progress in the computer hardware that runs it. It has been 
well documented that computer power has progressed at a constant rate since the introduction of 
the silicon chip. It was the co-founder of the silicon chip company Intel, Gordon Moore, who said in 
1965 that the number of transistors in an integrated circuit would double (and that the computer 
ǁould theƌefoƌe douďle iŶ poǁeƌͿ eǀeƌǇ tǁo Ǉeaƌs. Mooƌe͛s Laǁ, as it has ďeĐoŵe kŶoǁŶ, has held 
true now for over 50 years.  In stark contrast to this steady state of affairs, developments in AI have 
tended to have short periods of intense development followed by long fallow periods (as shown by 
the lack of progress between the two examples shown in section 2): 
͞the ǁaǇ ŵost people iŵagiŶe AI—a machine that thinks like a human—is a remote 
prospect, unlikely to be fulfilled without a better understanding of how our own 
minds work. AŶd the field has a histoƌǇ of ͚AI ǁiŶteƌs͛, ǁheŶ deǀelopŵeŶt gƌiŶds to 
a halt afteƌ a peƌiod of ƌapid adǀaŶĐe.͟ ;Paul-Choudhury, 2016, p.19)  
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Moreover, when significant jumps in AI are made, they are announced with a deal of fanfare and 
become lodged in public consciousness through newspaper articles about computers beating 
humans at Go, or headlines about Google introducing driverless cars. Each time this happens, more 
predictions are made as to how many job losses are imminent. 
It is also the case that the results of AI developments sometimes surprise even the programmers 
involved when the software behaves in unexpected ways. The programmer of AlphaGo above did not 
expect the software to make the moves it did, and very recently, when an artificial intelligence 
machine called Libratus built by Professor Tuomas Sandholm and his PhD student Noam Brown beat 
fouƌ of the ǁoƌld͛s ďest pokeƌ plaǇeƌs iŶ a ϮϬ daǇ touƌŶaŵeŶt, it stunned its makers. Poker was seen 
as even more of a challenge for AI than Go as it is a game with imperfect information as players 
ĐaŶŶot see eaĐh otheƌs͛ haŶds, aŶd the gaŵe ƌeƋuiƌes the ĐoƌƌeĐt iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of ŵisleadiŶg 
information in order to win. The makeƌs didŶ͛t teaĐh the sǇsteŵ to plaǇ pokeƌ, ďut gaǀe it the ƌules 
and let it learn itself over the course of trillions of hands of poker.  So the makers were not confident 
that it would win, but it did, to the tune of $1.7m in chips, by unexpectedly bluffing and aggressively 
ŵakiŶg huge ďets to eaƌŶ sŵall suŵs of ŵoŶeǇ. BƌoǁŶ said ͚WheŶ I see the ďot ďluff the huŵaŶs, 
I͛ŵ like, ͚I didŶ͛t tell it to do that. I had Ŷo idea it ǁas eǀeŶ Đapaďle of doiŶg that.͛ (Solon, 2017) If the 
results of their work surprise those that created it, it is not surprising that many people feel that such 
developments are cause for concern. 
3. The problem of leisure 
So is there any difference between the early fears of computers replacing jobs and the impact of AI 
reflected in the concerns of today? It is true that the jobs the computer was seen to threaten when it 
first appeared were not labour intensive in the way that the jobs were that were lost to machines 
during the Industrial Revolution, yet they were repetitive, uncreative tasks—accounting ledger input, 
payroll and tax calculations, production scheduling and so on. In the past, hindsight has shown that 
the vast majority of jobs lost to technological progress have been absorbed by other areas of activity, 
most notably in the rise of service industries, but of course, this cannot continue in perpetuity. And 
when the jobs being replaced by Artificial General Intelligence include jobs that require creativity, 
imagination and intuition, a solution may not appear as easily. One explanation for the continuation 
of fear regarding AI is the awareness people have that the oft-proposed solutions of increased leisure 
time, funded by the increases in productivity provided by computers, have singularly failed to 
appear. 
Predictions of a shorter working week and an easier life for society, as well as concerns over how we 
would fill our soon-to-be-extended leisure time enabled by advanced technologies, predate the 
emergence of artificial intelligence and even the electronic computer by some years. After all, the 
computer was merely another in a long line of technological inventions that radically changed society 
throughout the Industrial Revolution that preceded its appearance.  At the beginning of the Great 
Depression, the famous and highly influential economist, John Maynard Keynes, wrote that the 
economic pessimism being experienced at that time was merely a blip - the result of: 
 ͞the growing-pains of over-rapid changes, from the painfulness of readjustment 
between one economic period and another. The increase of technical efficiency has 
been taking place faster than we can deal with the problem of labour absorption; 
the improvement in the standard of life has ďeeŶ a little too ƋuiĐk.͟ (Keynes, 1931) 
Keynes believed that as society would inevitably benefit from further developments in technology of 
the kind that had fuelled the Industrial Revolution so powerfully, our standard of life would continue 
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to improve at an ever-increasing rate. We would, of course, undergo further periods of suffering 
fƌoŵ ͚teĐhŶologiĐal uŶeŵploǇŵeŶt͛ ďut this ǁould ďe ͚oŶlǇ a teŵpoƌaƌǇ phase of ŵaladjustŵeŶt͛.  
He pƌediĐted that ǁithiŶ the spaĐe of oŶe ĐeŶtuƌǇ, i.e. ďǇ ϮϬϯϬ, ŵaŶkiŶd ǁould haǀe solǀed ͚the 
eĐoŶoŵiĐ pƌoďleŵ͛ he had ďeeŶ faĐiŶg foƌ all of his eǆisteŶce – the struggle for subsistence – and be 
confronted with an entirely new problem. 
͞For the first time since his creation man will be faced with his real, his permanent 
problem – how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy 
the leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for him, to live 
ǁiselǇ aŶd agƌeeaďlǇ aŶd ǁell.͟ (Keynes, 1931) 
Keynes predictions were based on the assumption that although there would be some people for 
whom material wealth would remain a driving force, most people would be happy to have enough 
and then woƌk toǁaƌds helpiŶg otheƌs, as ͞everybody will need to do some work if he is to be 
ĐoŶteŶted. … ǁe shall eŶdeaǀoƌ to … ŵake ǁhat ǁoƌk theƌe is still to ďe doŶe as ǁidelǇ shaƌed as 
possible. Three-hour shifts or a fifteen-houƌ ǁeek.͟ (Keynes, 1931) 
Similar predictions were made in 1933 by the evolutionary biologist and humanist, Julian Huxley. He 
ǁas ĐoŶǀiŶĐed that ͞FiftǇ Ǉeaƌs heŶĐe … Laďouƌ-saving machinery will have so effectively saved 
labour that four-and-a-half houƌs ǁill ďe the aǀeƌage ǁoƌkiŶg daǇ͟ aŶd that this ǁould ŶatuƌallǇ 
result in more leisure time. While seeing this as a godsend, he also worried that much more leisure 
tiŵe ǁould pƌeseŶt seƌious issues: ͞[ďǇ ϭϵϴϱ] it ǁill haǀe ďeeŶ ƌealized that the problem of leisure is 
Ŷot ŵeƌelǇ oŶe of fiŶdiŶg ǁaǇs iŶ ǁhiĐh Ŷot to ǁoƌk,͟ ďut ͞the pƌoďleŵ of fiŶdiŶg ǁaǇs of ǁoƌkiŶg 
ǁhiĐh people shall eŶjoǇ.͟ ;HuǆleǇ, ϭϵϯϯͿ Like others of the time, Huxley assumed the drive to work 
all hours would disappear.  
4. Implications for Design practice 
These developments in AI and the accompanying societal changes predicted would certainly have 
significant impact on the practice of design at all levels if they are realised. At the very pragmatic end 
of the scale, designing everyday products to be completely manufactured and assembled by robot 
will merely see a logical extension of practices that have been in place and developing since General 
Motors first used robots in motor car assembly lines in 1962. (Robinson, 2014) More difficult will be 
the design of products expected to interact intelligently and understandably with people, and 
interaction designers face huge hurdles in designing interfaces for AI systems to work with people on 
a day-to-day basis. At the more idealistic end of the scale, the design of services and support 
infrastructures more suited to a society where large numbers of people have significant amounts of 
free time (whether desired or not) and potentially little if any income presents a whole set of much 
more wicked problems, way outside of the scope of this paper to explore.    
5. Conclusions 
So, in an attempt to answer the question explored in this paper, our relationship with technology is a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can bring a huge number of benefits for mankind (with 
effects ranging from increased lifespan, better health and wellbeing, increased food cultivation and 
so on) but on the other hand (particularly at an individual level) it often threatens a life of 
unemployment and poverty. One way to counter this would be to remove the threat of 
unemployment, and aim for a society where work is carried out on a voluntary basis and more for 
personal fulfillment as opposed to the pressing need for financial rewards. 
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KeǇŶes͛ ǀieǁs tuƌŶed out to be so wide of the mark because his conclusions were drawn on the 
assuŵptioŶs that theƌe ǁould ďe ͚Ŷo iŵpoƌtaŶt ǁaƌs aŶd Ŷo iŵpoƌtaŶt iŶĐƌease iŶ populatioŶ͛, ďoth 
of which did take place. In addition, he thought  ͞WheŶ the aĐĐuŵulatioŶ of ǁealth is no longer of 
high soĐial iŵpoƌtaŶĐe, theƌe ǁill ďe gƌeat ĐhaŶges iŶ the Đode of ŵoƌals.͟ ;KeǇŶes, ϭϵϯϭͿ But people 
doŶ͛t seeŵ to haǀe settled foƌ a ͚passaďle͛ eǆisteŶĐe. It appeaƌs that ŵaŶkiŶd is Ŷot as virtuous or 
moralistic as he thought. 
The problem is one of unrealistically expecting better-off individuals to act in an altruistic way. As 
oŶe authoƌ ǁƌote ͞faĐed ǁith the ĐhalleŶge of disƌuptiǀe Ŷeǁ teĐhŶologǇ, the ĐuƌƌeŶt politiĐal 
framework is no longer fit for purpose and its shortcomings are likely to lead to a backlash that could 
tuƌŶ ǀeƌǇ ŶastǇ.͟ ;Elliot, ϮϬϭϲͿ. More fundamental changes in the way individuals are rewarded for 
contributing to society is required. Moves in this direction have been mooted by numerous 
government parties and think tanks (including, in the UK, the Royal Society for Encouragement of 
Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (RSA)), which have put forward the idea of a universal basic 
income for everyone being provided by the government instead of providing benefits for those out of 
work, with the option for people add to their income through working. The lower stress and 
increased mental health benefits of such systems are seen to be enormous. With the basic 
requirements to live comfortably paid for, people could be free to choose to either support older 
ƌelatiǀes, ĐoŶĐeŶtƌate oŶ ďƌiŶgiŶg up ĐhildƌeŶ, ͞oƌ to puƌsue Đƌeatiǀe aŶd iŶŶoǀatiǀe ǁoƌk that 
tƌaditioŶallǇ paǇs less, like ŵusiĐ, aƌts aŶd iŶǀeŶtioŶ͟ ;HodsoŶ, ϮϬϭϲ, p. ϯϱͿ. Such a system is being 
trialed this year in Finland and in certain counties in the US, with the aim of removing disincentives 
to joining the labour force, and enabling people to enter the arena of employment on their own 
terms. Utopian ideas finally finding traction. 
Perhaps new technologies will always provoke worried responses unless there is an underlying 
change in the social and political systems within which we operate. The rise of Artificial Intelligence 
and the consequent lack of employment will continue to be a concern for us all as long as we remain 
within a neo-liberal capitalist system that promotes individual gain over collective wealth. Whatever 
happens, there will be a considerable impact on design and the expectations made of designers. 
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